ICS Security News

If you had any doubts about the thirst for ICS security news in the press, this week’s articles on some research from NC State provided a vivid demonstration. NC State puts out a press release on some early research, far away from anything that can be purchased, questionable if it would be of value in and ICS, and it turns into articles such as New Software Protects Networked Control Systems From Cyber Attacks.

Let me be clear that is not a knock on the research itself. We have been advocating and highlighting ICS security research for almost a decade now with our S4 conference. The researchers at NC State have an interesting approach that we might consider worthy of a slot at S4x14 or some future event as it develops.

The paper Convergence and Recovery Analysis of the Secure Distributed Control Methodology for D-NCS is available online.

The base idea is to eliminate sensor data from a process if the sensor or device passing the sensor data has been compromised. Actually, this could be due to any fault, not just a physical or cyber compromise. The challenge is how does the system know the sensor or device has been compromised?

The researchers rely primarily on a consensus algorithms, which I believe would severely limit it’s practical use. The example given in Section V.A is easy to understand. Eight temperature sensors take a measurement, and sensors 5 and 6 vary significantly from the converged value of the other six sensors. They are considered compromised and excluded from the process.

The problem with using consensus algorithms to detect cyber attacks or other anomalies is it requires the deployment and maintenance of a large number of additional sensors that don’t exist today in most control systems. Many times sensors are not redundant (let alone in numbers to allow consensus calculations), but data smoothing/interpolation takes place to remove and replace flawed or missing data. In a sense the researchers suggest doing this in a brute force way rather than through intelligent use of surrounding state and data.

There are high risk / high value sensors that implement a simple variant of the consensus algorithm suggested by the researchers. For example, you will sometimes see three sensors used in the chem sector, and one of the sensor’s data discarded if it varies more than a certain percentage from the other two sensors’ data.

If this is pushed out to the field or plant, as the researchers envision and makes sense, then the consensus algorithm would be implemented in the PLC which is much more likely to be attacked than the sensor. And there is still the data integrity issue in the PLC demonstrated by Stuxnet.

A more promising and realistic and difficult approach is to combine the suggested removal of data from a process with process anomaly detection rather than consensus algorithms. There have been a few sessions at S4 where researchers have tried to model possible states of a process and detect when impossible or unlikely states or state chains occurred. The most detailed have involved substation processes, and it has worked. The problem is it was very time consuming to develop the model to detect anomalies.

One minor item in  the paper particularly worried and bothered me. The researchers used the term Distributed Network Control System (D-NCS). DCS is a very common term if they wanted to focus on plant implementations, or the could have used ICS. Did they not know what terminology is commonly used by the people they hope will use the research?

The NC State press release was reasonable, not sensational, and sensible marketing of their research capabilities. The press are simply feeding the reading public what they want. The oddity is the interest in control system security is stronger outside the control system community than inside the community where the majority still hope the issue just goes away.

Image by chrissam42