Rubén Santamarta did a fantastic static analysis of this device's firmware here, and I won't repeat his findings here (I did that once already). In addition to having a slew of backdoor accounts, an open telnet service, and an open WindRiver RPC-Debug service open on...

Where is the outrage? We hoped for at least the start of outrage demanding fragile and insecure PLC's in the critical infrastructure be either fixed or replaced. Of course, we expected some aimed at us for pointing out the problem and creating tools to make it easy to...

While Kim Zetter's Wired article had a sensational "Vigilante" teaser headline, it was a fair accounting of the presentation at S4. And I was very pleased that she captured a couple of key quotes on the "why" of Project Basecamp and our goal of making it a...

This morning, at our S4 Conference, Reid Wightman gave a detailed two-hour presentation on the Project Basecamp results. Project Basecamp had six great researchers looking for vulnerabilities in six different PLC’s / field devices, and the PLC’s took a beating. There...

The UK Government Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) published a list of 20 Critical Controls for Cyber Defence in conjunction with SANS. Many in the ICS world don't follow SANS, so this distribution may reach a broader ICS audience. The list is...

Industrial Defender recently hired Pike Research to write a research report titled: Convergence in Automation: Systems Protection, Monitoring, Managing, and Securing Control Systems, and it's available for free with registration on the ID site. There also is a webcast...

Question - Can a PLC or other field device be certified as secure if lack of basic authentication allows an attacker to control a process and compromise the integrity of the PLC? Between Dillon's S7 work, Ruben's recent Modicon post and all the effort around our...